In this paper, the meaning of attitude and its role in an agent's job selection behavior is discussed. When agents build teams, a critical step in improving performance is choosing which jobs to work on in the context of both changing environmental conditions and other agents' uncertain behaviors. This research introduces a decision theoretic model and the concept of attitude, and provides methods to incorporate different possible attitudes in constructing an expected utility function to guide agents in ranking potential jobs. In this way, attitudes define how an agent prioritizes different possible job choices. Three types of attitudes are defined: attitudes toward proactive behavior, potential risk, and reward. The paper shows that agents using the presented model are able to increase their payoff by identifying optimal jobs under different environmental conditions with varied parameters.
Introduction
Multi-agent systems increasingly represent mature technologies, capable of overcoming the limitation of individuals to solve problems in specific domains [1] . Furthermore, pervasive connectivity of the Internet and advances of mobile agent technology suggest potential of open electronic marketplaces, where massive numbers of self-interested agents interact with each other, each taking different roles to solve a constant stream of problems in the network [1] . In these kinds of scenarios, agents can encounter many different kinds of markets and must easily interact with unknown individuals to build a team [2] . Because of these challenges, it is essential that agents be able to consider the potential risk due to the other agents' uncertain behavior and to respond to changing environmental situation [3] .
More particularly, in an open environment, agents may lack information on possible partners, such as a partner's past preferences and/or performance when the number of interactions over a period is limited. Furthermore, agents may have difficulty maintaining a consistent model of other agents' behavior in the face of frequent population changes as well as agents' behavior changes. However, even within this context of unknown partner behavior, it is critical for an agent to estimate the potential risks of selecting a given job and to avoid failure to meet job requirements. In other words, choosing the "right" type of jobs to maximize possible payoff in the context of potential risk due to the uncertain partner behaviors (e.g., rejection from uncooperative agents or job failure due to an unreliable team member) is essential to improve an agent's outcome. In addition, when selecting jobs to work on, agents need to consider the potential for unexpected changes in the environment, such as dynamic payoff, penalty values, and time constraints on job completion. This research addresses an agent's decision-making during the job selection phase in the context of other agents' uncertain behavior and changing environment. This research introduces a normative decision theoretic model and the notion of attitude. The normative decision-making theory uses relevant utilities and corresponding probabilities to shape decision-making process. The notion of attitude has been applied to dictate an individual's behavior pattern across different environments and contexts. The utility function aggregates all the expected utilities and probabilities into an equation to choose the best option available [4] . In this research, an agent uses this equation as an expected utility function to guide its own behavior in a certain way to maximize its reward. Then, attitude has been defined as the tendency to act in a certain way towards the objects [5] and to evaluate particular entities with some degree of favor or disfavor [6] . Among social and behavioral psychologists, attitude is also known as a good predictor of behavior [7] ; thus, attitude can be described as a set of parameters to dictate an individual agent's behavior patterns. The research proposes an attitude model that includes an agent's attitudes toward proactive behavior, potential risk, and potential reward. Furthermore, this research proposes a method to incorporate an agent's attitudes when constructing an expected utility function for the job selection problem.
In addition, we investigate the effectiveness of agents learning the "right" set of attitudes to select an optimal job to work on given different environment. An agent needs to alter its attitudes to adapt to different environments. An agent reviews the changes in its outcomes, and then tries to predict a future state using simple projection technique: a technique to predict a future state based on present data or trends [8] . The agent may then alter its attitude in a way to increase its outcome based on the given heuristics. Section 2 describes the related work. Section 3 describes problem environment and Section 4 presents job selection mechanism. Experiment design and analysis on the result is presented in Section 5 and the future work and conclusion is offered in Section 6.
Related Work
Castelfranchi, et al [9] introduced the notion of attitude to explain conditional personality traits on a given circumstance. In this sense, attitude possesses a strong notion of adaptation as a main feature, while a personality trait defines the stable nature of an agent's personality to represent stable behavior patterns [10] . This paper investigates the use of attitude in team formation to adapt to changes in the environment and to identify better jobs to improve the agent's payoff, while reducing possibility of failure. Many researchers have studied task allocation problem in the context of coalition formation. Shehory and Kraus presented coalition formation and task allocation methods with self-interested agents using auction mechanism [11] . While their research shows how self-interested agents select jobs under incomplete information, there is no uncertainty in agents' behavior and environment. In addition, some work is focused on optimal allocation of task among agents with limited resources [12] . However, in such work, agents cannot influence other agents' performance and assume no uncertainties in the environment.
Abdallah and Lesser [13] proposed the formal decision theoretic model for an agent to decompose a task into subtasks, find agents to assign the task, and then negotiate with agent to obtain commitment to execute these subtasks. Even though they address uncertainty when an agent do not keep their commitments and the set of tasks to be allocated changes stochastically, their work focuses on modeling the decision process of a single mediator and does not scale as the number of subtasks increases.
This work addresses the job selection problem under uncertainties due to the both agents and environment, especially when an agent cannot know other agents' behavior a priori and has difficulty in estimating their future behavior as well as changes in the environment. In addition, this research investigates ways of minimizing partner uncertainty without explicitly modeling or evaluating other agents in the system.
Environment
The environment consists of a set of n selfinterested agents, , … , and l jobs, , … , . Each job ( ) consists of set of tasks , … ,
. Each agent ( ) has an associated set of capabilities , … , and can participate in any instances of task that requires that capability. Only a set of agents with the required capabilities can perform the tasks in each job. Each job has associated size (number of tasks) and an expiration time ( . To motivate agents to form a team, the number of capabilities possessed by each agent is always smaller than the number of task instances in a job. Each agent knows its own capabilities and capabilities of all the other agents, and must form a team and complete the entire set of tasks within the given expiration time, otherwise, the leader of the team must pay a given penalty ( ) to the job owner. Each task has an associated payoff ( ) which varies among the instances of the tasks. Two different instances of the same general task can have different payoff values. The payoff is distributed to the agents who worked on the each task instance when all task instances in a job are successfully completed within the expiration time. In other words, if a team of agents fails to complete a job, even if all but one agent completed their portion of the tasks in the job, no agent in the team receives a payoff. The payoff is function of quality agents provide. If aggregated quality of solution for the tasks in a job is low, agents get lower payoff. For example, if the aggregated quality of solution is 0.8 and assigned payoff is 10, an agent gets payoff of 8 instead of 10. The environment has a jobmanaging agent whose role is to create and remove jobs in the multi-agent system. The job-managing agent represents external entities who post information about jobs in multi-agent system. The proposed environment model captures the various dynamics of the domain that this paper is interested in, such as time constraint, different numbers of tasks in a job, different payoff values for a task, and different penalty values for a job. These variables in the environment model give agents various decisionmaking points: Is it better to proactively search for jobs or passively waiting for jobs to be offered? Do I want to be risk-averse or risk-seeking? What are the risks to consider when working as a team? These questions are addressed in the job selection mechanism described in the following sections. Given the environmental model, an attitude-driven decision theoretic model to control an agent's job selection mechanism is described in the next section.
Job Selection Problem
The notion of attitude can provide a mechanism to dictate behavioral intentions of an agent. In addition, it can be used in modifying the parameters of behavioral intentions to control an agent's behavior [7, 14] . An agent decides how to behave based on the expected utility of all the possible choices. The expected utilities are calculated based on their possible consequences including expected payoff and corresponding risk. The agent's preference over the possible consequences can be interpreted as the agent's own attitude. We therefore present alternative means of determining a utility function so that the calculation of utilities depends on an agent's assigned attitudes. In this way, agent attitudes define the priority that an agent places on the various choices it may have regarding job selection.
Selecting Jobs: Attitudes
The attitude model is represented in terms of a particular combination of underlying attitudes that influence the agents' behavior intentions thus guide its behavior under several circumstances. This research defines three attitudes to influence an agent's behavioral intentions thus guide behavior tendency. An agent's attitude toward proactive behavior is used at the initial stage of team formation to decide whether the agent wants to be a leader and proactively search for jobs and team members. If an agent has a positive attitude toward proactive behavior, the agent shows assertive behavior when searching for the jobs. However, if an agent has a negative attitude toward proactive behavior, it prefers to get suggestions from other agents about jobs to work on. The attitudes toward risk and reward are paired to give a priority to either possible reward or potential risk. An agent with a negative attitude toward risk has risk-averse behavior, meaning that it prefers low variances (e.g., fewer missing capabilities, fewer jobs to work on simultaneously), while an agent with a positive attitude toward risk cares less about potential risk of failing jobs, and thus has risk-blinded behavior. These attitude parameters are used as a weighted value in agent's utility function to dictate agent's behavior regarding job selection.
Selecting Jobs: Job Selection Utility
Given a model that represents the attitudes of an agent, the next step is to show how an agent uses this attitude model in constructing a utility function. Job selection utility (JU) function is used in evaluation phase to rank the available jobs. The agents decide what to work on based on the value of JU for all the possible choices. An agent makes a list of all the jobs it can work on, and then ranks them based on the value of JU. An agent, then, chooses the top ranking job in the list. The JU of the possible choices is calculated based on their possible consequences, including expected rewards and corresponding risks.
, where Reward is represented as function of (potential payoff agent i can get by choosing job j).
,
where Risk is represented as function of (potential penalty agent i could get when job j is failed) and ratio of missing tasks ( in a job. If there are more missing tasks in a selected job than other jobs, a leader agent needs to hire more team members. More team members mean an increased degree of uncertainty and increased possibility of failure. When estimating Reward and Risk, instead of using current numerical value of potential payoff and penalty , an agent estimates the degree of potential payoff and penalty by projecting the current value to its previous experience as shown in the following equations:
where b represents the steepness of the curve, max(r) represents the maximum payoff an agent received before, and max(p) shows the maximum penalty an agent received before. and project potential payoff ( ) and penalty ( ) into sigmoid curve. For example, as shown in Figure 1 , if the potential payoff is two and max(r) is ten, an agent gets 0.14 as an estimated degree of the potential payoff.
Using the proposed JU function, an agent ranks all the possible jobs it can work on, and then selects the top-ranked job. Once the agent selects the job to work on, the agent tries to build a team to complete the selected job. Since this research only focuses on the job selection problem in a team formation domain, a leader agent selects team members based on which agents have capabilities matching the required tasks. If there is more than one possible agent to choose from, a leader agent randomly selects an agent.
Agents select jobs based on the proposed JU value, which has estimated Risk and Reward parameters. The possibility of getting a payoff or penalty might differ given a specific situation. In this sense, rather than considering both Risk and Reward with same priority, an agent tries to prioritize one of them given different environments. For example, if the time limit to complete a job is tight, a leader agent might be more sensitive to the potential risk to avoid possible rejection or task failure thus minimizing the possibility of getting a penalty. Alternatively, if the amount of penalty has negligible impact on the total outcome, an agent might pursue jobs with higher payoff regardless of the possible chance of getting some penalty. Prioritizing is controlled by an agent's attitudes toward proactive behavior, reward, and risk. Figure. 1 Getting the degree of current potential payoff by projecting it to sigmoid curve
Selecting Jobs: Learning
An agent needs to alter its attitudes to adapt to different environments. When the environment in which agents are situated is changing, agents must learn continuously in order to allow the agents to adapt themselves to a changing environment.
Projection is a simple technique to predict a future state based on present data or trends [8] . An agent reviews the changes in its outcomes and projects the current trend in its outcomes to the future. In this sense, an agent can predict the future state based on the current outcomes. The agent may then alter its attitude in a way to increase its outcome based on its prediction. An agent aggregates all the payoffs and penalties it received during a specific period and compares that result to the results from previous periods. The agent, then, alters its attitudes using the following heuristics:
1. If the aggregated penalty has been increased in the current period, an agent increases its attitude toward risk and decreases its attitude toward proactive behavior. 2. If the aggregated payoff has been decreased or not been increased in the current period, an agent increases its attitude toward reward and proactive behavior.
If the aggregated penalty is insignificant compare
to the aggregated payoff, an agent decreases its attitude toward risk and increases its attitude toward reward and proactive behavior. 4. If the aggregated payoff is insignificant compare to the aggregated penalty, an agent decreases its attitude toward reward and proactive behavior and increases its attitude toward risk.
Experiment and Result
Experiments were conducted to determine how the proposed job selection mechanism performs in different environmental settings. In each experiment, we examined the specific effect of each attitude on the agents' outcome to find correlations between selected attitudes and resulting payoffs given various environmental situations. In addition, we also examined the benefit of altering attitudes using the projection technique and corresponding heuristics described above in a dynamic environment.
There were two distinct sets of experiments to examine 1) the effect of attitudes in an agent's outcome and 2) the learning mechanism to alter agents' attitudes. During the course of the experiments, the number of jobs was fixed at 10 and whenever a job was completed or failed, a new job was introduced as a replacement. Job expiration time was also changed to see which kind of attitude produced better outcomes with limited time to complete. Our intuition on the expiration time is that, if there is less time to form a 
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Given the different sets of environments, we are able to see which specific attitudes perform better than others. In an environment in which job completion time is limited, agents with a restrained attitude, as opposed to proactive and risk-blinded attitude, outperform the other types. However, when competition to get a job among leader agents is high (more leaders in the system), avoiding the competition and waiting for a job to be offered (being suggestible) can be a good strategy. Since attitude is regarded as a summary evaluation of objects [9] and is learned through feedback from the environment, this research also provided a method to capture current environmental parameters and an agent's resulting outcome and use those factors as part of an evaluation mechanism to alter the agent's attitude. Given a set previous performance results of an agent, we project the future environmental state and use heuristics to alter the agent's attitude, thus allowing an agent to perform well even though the environment has changed.
Our future goal is to develop a mechanism to model other agents' behavior using personality traits.
Although it is often difficult to get explicit information about other agents' behavior, it may be possible to model and estimate other agents' behavior tendencies by observing their interactions. Such a model will help an agent to identify the most helpful agents in the system, and therefore to reduce the potential risk of team formation failure. In this sense, an attitude model can be used as a decision making mechanism for an agent's own behavior, while a personality trait model can represent other agents' behavior. In combination, these two models may help an agent to identify compatible partners for team formation.
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